The Doctrine Of Armed Struggle — A Fatal Flaw For The Palestinian Cause

-Analysis-

BEIRUT — The idea of armed struggle has occupied the political consciousness of the Palestinians, since the launch of the contemporary national movement six decades ago. Indeed, the armed struggle is imprinted on the character of its primary political organizations and entities — which inevitably shapes relations directly with the Palestinian people.

The centrality of the armed struggle has also affected the nature of Palestinian foreign relations, making its leadership dependent on external support, whether armed, financial, or political.

Fatah’s original call for armed struggle was considered, at the time, the only factor that had enabled it to impose itself on the Palestinian and Arab political arena, which was crowded with nationalist and leftist forces, as well as to attract the Palestinians and to lift them out of the shock of the Nakba (“catastrophe”) that was the expulsion from their land during the 1948 Israeli-Arab war.

The call for armed struggle was pragmatic. That was evident by the fact that Fatah, in its early literature, was talking about the “mindful involvement” of regimes in the liberation battle (of Palestine), and about considering the Palestinian dimension as the forefront of the Arab armies in that battle.

The problem is that all of this happened despite the weak capabilities of the Palestinians, their submission to multiple authorities, and their dependence on external support. The leadership at the time — particularly Fatah, which engineered the Palestinian national movement — was well aware of all of these shortcomings.

Of course, years later, the Fatah movement would itself attempt to lead the Palestinians from armed struggle to political negotiation. It led the transformation of the entire Palestinian national movement from being a national liberation movement to an Authority (ruling power) over the Palestinian people, under the auspices of Israel in the Occupied Territories, which is part of historic Palestine.

Rise of Hamas

It was Fatah’s previous transformations — coupled with the obsolescence and exhaustion of the Palestinian national movement, and subsequently the marginalization of the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLO) — were the main factors behind the rise of Hamas. In one sense, having started its armed struggle in its own way and according to its terms, Hamas picked up from where Fatah had left off.

Hamas appeared in the Palestinian street as a competitor and rival to Fatah over power, status, and leadership, particularly after the 1993 Oslo Accords, which were consolidated with the division of the government in two: one for Fatah in the West Bank, and the second for Hamas in Gaza.

Hamas acted as if Gaza was a liberated area.

Fatah continued on the path of negotiations (except during the second Intifada, 2000-2004), before the death of its leader, Yasser Arafat. Hamas, meanwhile, continued the idea of armed struggle, but in a different form when it took over power in Gaza.

Hamas acted as if Gaza was a liberated area, and could be turned into a base for the liberation of Palestine, to wage war as an army against an army, with missile and drone bombing, which culminated with the Oct=; 7 attack on the Israeli settlements and the capture of dozens of Israelis.

The Oct. 7 attack was considered a massive political, moral and military blow to Israel, yet in this unprecedented defeat Israel found an opportunity to launch a genocidal war against the Palestinians, which has been continuing for more than five months.

Power of popular uprisings

The oversized role of the armed struggle, the lack of Palestinian capabilities, and the militarization of the Palestinian identity — in discourses, structures, and forms of action — were a historic mistake. It was bound to lead to a weakening of the political structure of the Palestinian national movement, and the marginalization of the status of the popular dimension in the struggle against Israel.

For the Palestinian struggle has also included popular uprisings, in particular The First Intifada (1987 to1993) in the West Bank and Gaza, and the political struggle of the 1948 Palestinians (the Palestinians in Israel), who played a major role during the popular uprising to defend the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem (2021) that aborted Israel’s attempts to control it.

Indeed, the rockets that were fired from Gaza at the time of the uprising to supposedly defend Sheikh Jarrah ultimately led to its decline, even after it looked to be on course to becoming a third intifada.

The military option has long achieved sacred status that banned any discussion or questions about it. That has given the tyranny of militarism the upper hand at the expense of politics and popular movements. Palestinians have paid a heavy price for this error, seeing decades of sacrifice and no true political achievements to show for it.

Transformation into “Authority”

The Palestinian national movement has been transformed into a ruling power wherever it exists. That explains that the legacy of that movement in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon was limited to militias subject to varying tensions and alliances, with the absence of any cultural, educational or civil institutions after being removed from Lebanon following the 1982 Israeli invasion.

In the West Bank and Gaza, we have witnessed the movement’s transformation into security services whose goal is to protect the existing authority and control society, at the expense of community building and societal and economic development. Meanwhile, the discourse of armed struggle continues, occupying the political consciousness of the Palestinians.

None of this should a priori delegitimize the Palestinian armed struggle.

It is important to note that the contemporary Palestinian armed struggle did serve its purpose until 1974 — 50 years ago —rallying the people of Palestine and the Arab and international community’s recognition of the PLO, the people of Palestine and their rights.

It was after that, when the armed struggle began to lose its function, and no new achievement was added until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987.

None of this, however, should a priori delegitimize the Palestinian armed struggle, which should be weighed as a possibly appropriate form of struggle in each circumstance, according to Arab and international circumstances, and according to the endurance of the Palestinian people.

The guiding idea is that there is no political or military choice that is sacred, or somehow shielded from criticism and accountability. This is even truer in a complex, intertwined and important issue such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.