Could Iran’s New Reformist President Really Be A Path To Middle East Détente?

-Analysis-

Very soon after winning an election with a low voter turnout, Iran’s would-be “moderate” president-elect Masoud Pezeshkian sent messages of support to the various Middle East militias backed by Tehran, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, and he met with Revolutionary Guard commanders inside Iran.

The gestures are meant to signal to foreign observers that Iran is not ready to change its regional policies or abandon its proxy forces, known in Tehran as the Axis of Resistance. The West may of course refuse to hear this message, given its dogged belief that a reformist president will mean détente, even lukewarm entente, between Iran and the West.

Western media have even seen positive signals elsewhere. For example, Hezbollah has stated it would respect any ceasefire deal signed between Hamas and Israel and would stop firing on northern Israel, which the West attributes to changes in Tehran; they believe the regime has asked Hezbollah to dial down its belligerence, for now.

The positive signals are furthermore seen as the fruit of discreet conversations in Oman and an informal agreement between Iranian and American envoys, reached prior to Iran’s farcical election, on ending fighting in Gaza and releasing Israeli hostages.

It is difficult to confirm any of that, as the U.S. says it hasn’t talked to Iran for months, while Iran’s acting foreign minister, Ali Baqeri-Kani, said on July 11 that the conversations were ongoing.

The easing of tensions does not in any case mean an end to confrontation. Neither the Iranian regime nor Israel are interested in immediately abandoning the fight that began with Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

Keeping Israel distracted

Months into Israel’s retaliation — which has become a calamitous quagmire and caused thousands of Palestinian deaths — the Iranian regime is reluctant to see the conflict end, but it also does not seek an escalation. Tehran wants the conflict to continue enough to sustain or even strengthen its position in any multilateral negotiations.

Tehran has managed to sour relations between Israel and Washington.

Moreover, the Israel-Hamas war has allowed it to accelerate its nuclear program, knowing that Israel is less likely to hit targets in Iran as long as it is mired in Gaza and Lebanon. Deftly if dishonorably, Tehran has managed to sour relations between Israel and Washington, and turn European opinion against it.

But of course, Tehran’s regional role is not restricted to Israel, Gaza and the West.

Fanning crises elsewhere

Arab states have all had to grapple, to a certain degree, with the effects of Iran’s meddling and the activities of the Revolutionary Guards; Iran has fanned domestic crises in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

In Lebanon, most political groups see Hezbollah, with its military and economic preponderance, as having hijacked the country to serve Iranian interests. If Israel were to engage in a full-blown war with Hezbollah, ordinary Lebanese, like the Palestinians in Gaza, would pay its terrible price.

Already, every day, the Lebanese are paying the price of decades of a civil war that has never, truly ended. Instead, it has rotted the state and reduced the country to a state of exhaustion. The violence of those decades included an Israeli invasion in 1982 to flush out Palestinian guerrillas, and massive bombardments in 2006 when Israel sought to crush Hezbollah.

The Iranian regime is also busy in Syria.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already warned the Lebanese — as if there is anything they could do — that their country would be bombed “into the stone age” if Hezbollah were not reined in. After 2006, Tehran decided to supply Hezbollah with enough firepower to keep Israel tied down and distracted. And it has continued to ensure Hezbollah’s arsenal is well-stocked, including Russian weaponry recently bought and sent by Tehran.

Tehran squeezing Assad

Recent reports indicate Hezbollah may have been stockpiling Iranian rockets and weaponry in Beirut’s airport — which can only strike fear into the hearts of Beirut residents, as the airport is close to the city. Any bombardment or an explosion there could be as destructive as the port explosion of a suspected Hezbollah warehouse in 2020.

The Iranian regime is also busy in Syria, with a conceivable or suspected role in the death of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s media adviser Luna al-Shibl. She died following a car crash with a lingering whiff of foul play and echoes of the June helicopter crash that killed Iran’s then president, Ebrahim Raisi. Al-Shibl’s husband, Ammar al-Saati, who is said to oppose close ties with Iran, had reportedly fallen out of grace, and the couple was recently prevented from leaving Syria.

Al-Shibl’s brother has also been arrested, ostensibly in relation to Israel’s attack on an Iranian consular building in Damascus, months before. The recent death, arrests and several other dismissals suggest Iran has been pressuring Assad to remove Tehran’s critics from positions of power.