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America’s Space Shuttles Were Doomed To Fail

Op-Ed: The United States has little reason to celebrate the end of its 30-year-old space shuttle program, according to France’s Le Monde. The 1970s-era space ships accomplished little and cost far too much – both in terms of dollars and human lives.

Space Shuttle Columbia STS-1 launch, April 12, 1981 (NASA)
Space Shuttle Columbia STS-1 launch, April 12, 1981 (NASA)
Jerôme Fenoglio

In the end, a handful of achievements in orbit were not enough to make up for the high costs and risks of America's space shuttles. The longest dead-end in its space exploration, it is a failure, nevertheless, that the United States is most proud of.

With the scheduled return to Earth next week of Atlantis, the era of the space shuttle will officially come to an end, 30 years after the inaugural flight on April 12, 1981 of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Of these last three decades of coming and going in the cosmos, the United States will only want to remember the "extraordinary accomplishments' that their president, Barack Obama, has just celebrated. They will boast about the fact that the space shuttle was a technical achievement at a time when the engineers who designed it still worked with slide-rules. And, even though the development of digital simulation and ultra-powerful computers make the space shuttles now look like magnificent flying anachronisms, they survived.

But this idea that the shuttle program's biggest achievement was its longevity is just an illusion. The longest program in NASA's history is also one that was doomed from the start, in the 1970s. The space shuttle was born at difficult time for the U.S. space agency, which faced major budget cuts as a result of the oil crisis and resulting economic dip.

Those restrictions weakened the program from the beginning. Because they are heavy, the shuttles can't leave the ground by themselves: they need rocket boosters to tear them away from the earth's gravitational pull. The budget cuts also meant that designers chose in the end not to implement expensive but vital improvements, such as a back-up system used to protect its crew in emergency situations.

Those repeated compromises explain what happened on Jan. 28, 1986, when the Challenger exploded 73 seconds after takeoff, killing its seven passengers. The crew was not able to escape because of a fire in one of the vessel's defective rocket boosters.

Just An Illusion

The program survived the disaster. But the dreams on which it was created did not. In developing the shuttle program, NASA envisioned a plane that would fly to space and back with the steadiness of a long haul flight. It also imagined an affordable machine that would not only transport astronauts, but could also ship heavy goods to the cosmos.

The Challenger accident succeeded in demonstrating the limits of NASA's dreams. To be able to transport men and at the same time materials in one ship was supposed to reduce risks and costs. Instead it increased them. Flights transporting humans, which always demand more precautions, are difficult to accommodate with the transportation of satellites and other objects, which always need more power.

Space shuttle launches are extremely expensive, especially compared to the costs of sending up non-reusable shuttles such as the European civilian Ariane vehicle. The U.S. military realized this as far back as the late 1980s, when it stopped entrusting its spy satellites to the dangerous and costly space shuttles. With this decision, the vessels became little more than luxury vehicles for glamorous missions.

In 1993, one of NASA's shuttles gloriously succeeded in correcting in orbit the Hubble spatial telescope's short-sightedness. Then, the program dedicated itself to building the International Space Station (ISS). But this was interrupted by a second disaster on Feb. 1, 2003, when the Columbia shuttle exploded on its way through the atmosphere back to Earth.

This second disaster crushed the last hopes of those who still wanted to believe in those flying machines. Shuttles are dangerous: they killed 14 astronauts during their missions, which is much more than all the other space programs combined. Even worse, NASA's lack of organization increased the risks of such a program. Just like with the Challenger incident, the investigation into the Columbia explosion eventually turned into an indictment against the agency, its work methods, its decision-making, its technological bias and its arrogant corporate culture.

The fate of the three remaining shuttles has been sealed for good this time. Their next missions will take place in museum galleries. What's not clear is what this will mean for U.S. space exploration. Space shuttles, after all, remain the only way for American astronauts to have access to the cosmos.

There in lies the difference with the brilliant and successful Apollo project, which cost 150 billion dollars and whose end did not mean a violent break in space exploration. The space shuttle program, in contrast, failed slowly. It cost 210 billion dollars in all and emptied NASA's budget. It was shut down too late and its financial costs stifled other projects that should have developed.

The shuttle program began amidst an acute budget crisis. It ends at a time when the U.S. government's budget crisis is even worse. This lack of money, plus a lack of public interest, could mean that with the failure of the space shuttle program, American space ambitions could be permanently paralyzed.

Read the original article in French

Photo - NASA

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Utter Pessimism, What Israelis And Palestinians Share In Common

Right now, according to a joint survey of Israelis and Palestinians, hopes for a peaceful solution of coexistence simply don't exist. The recent spate of violence is confirmation of the deepest kind of pessimism on both sides for any solution other than domination of the other.

An old Palestinian protester waves Palestinian flag while he confronts the Israeli soldiers during the demonstration against Israeli settlements in the village of Beit Dajan near the West Bank city of Nablus.

A Palestinian protester confronts Israeli soldiers during the demonstration against Israeli settlements in the West Bank village of Beit Dajan on Jan. 6.

Pierre Haski


PARIS — Just before the latest outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, a survey of public opinion among the two peoples provided a key to understanding the current situation unfolding before our eyes.

It was a joint study, entitled "Palestinian-Israeli Pulse", carried out by two research centers, one Israeli, the other Palestinian, which for years have been regularly asking the same questions to both sides.

The result is disastrous: not only is the support for the two-state solution — Israel and Palestine side by side — at its lowest point in two decades, but there is now a significant share of opinion on both sides that favors a "non-democratic" solution, i.e., a single state controlled by either the Israelis or Palestinians.

This captures the absolute sense of pessimism commonly felt regarding the chances of the two-state option ever being realized, which currently appears to be our grim reality today. But the results are also an expression of the growing acceptance on both sides that it is inconceivable for either state to live without dominating the other — and therefore impossible to live in peace.

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