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TOPIC: ukraine

FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War

How A 1930s Soviet Famine Targeted Ukraine — And Why It Matters More Than Ever

Ukraine and countries around the world recognize the Holodomor, the famine which killed millions of Ukrainians in the early 1930s, as a genocide caused by Soviet authorities. But Russia still refuses to admit responsibility. A new study uses agricultural records and mathematical modeling to show that the famine clearly targeted Ukrainians.

KYIV — The Holodomor was one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of the 20th century. In the course of just two years, from 1932 to 1933, between 5 and 10.8 million people died of hunger in the Soviet Union — at least 2.6 to 3.9 million of them in Ukraine alone.

Until the 1980s, the Soviet government denied that the tragedy happened at all. Modern Russian historians now agree that the famine was caused by human action. But while Ukraine, the European Parliament, the U.S. and Canada, among other countries, have all recognized Holodomor as a genocide, most Russian historians still disagree, arguing that people also died in other grain-producing regions of the Soviet Union.

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This historical dispute has strong political significance. The Ukrainian government often repeats its demand for apology and restitution from Russia, the legal successor to the USSR, for orchestrating the famine. The Kremlin says describing the Holodomor as a genocide is anti-Russian propaganda. After its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces dismantled memorials to the Holodomor in occupied cities of Mariupol and Kreminna.

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First We'll Take Kyiv: Inside Putin's Original Plans To Occupy Ukraine

If Russia's invasion of Ukraine hadn't gone so badly, the Kremlin had two possible plans for governing the country under the Russian flag.

KYIV — On the morning of Feb. 23, 2022, regiments of the Russian army were preparing to attack and encircle Kyiv. Within three days, the Kremlin expected to see the Russian tricolor flying over the city.

What was supposed to happen if Putin’s invasion had gone according to plan? After overthrowing Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky's government, who would have seized power and led Putin's Ukraine?

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Ukrainian news site Ukrainska Pravda looks at the two scenarios Russian strategists had laid out for the capture of Kyiv, as well as which Ukrainian officials were expected to help.

"If you think that the Russians had a clear plan as to who would end up ruling Ukraine, you are very much mistaken,” a high-ranking Ukrainian intelligence officer said. “Their primary goal was simply this: the government had to fall. According to their plan, that would have happened on the third day. On the tenth day, they would have gained control over the entire country. The specific names of those who would be the new power were not that clear."

For Russia, it was simple: if Kyiv surrendered, Moscow would rule everything. That was what mattered.

Although plans were not set in stone, Moscow still had two options in its playbook.

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Oscar for Navalny? The World Still Doesn’t Understand What’s Wrong With Russia

The Oscar for best documentary went to the portrait of jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, considered Vladimir Putin’s top domestic rival. If it was meant as a gesture of solidarity with Ukraine, Hollywood has badly missed the mark.

-OpEd-

The Oscar awarded Sunday to “Navalny,” the documentary about Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was not much of a surprise. As a storyline, it follows all the laws of Hollywood: a courageous hero, an absolute villain, a love story, oppressed peoples — and a sequel. It also, of course, allows the movie industry to collectively and very publicly declare its strong stance against Vladimir Putin and his invasion of Ukraine.

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But if Hollywood thought this Oscar would be well-received in Ukraine, they got hold of the wrong script.

Assigning this highest honor of Western culture to Navalny is instead a reminder of how much is still misunderstood about Russia — and what must be done about its invasion of Ukraine.

Sure, Putin’s No. 1 domestic rival plays his role perfectly: Navalny is a caring father, a loving husband, a brave man, an honest politician. The film evokes all the right emotions: sympathy and admiration for the protagonist and regret for the country's plight and its citizens, who, like Navalny, have become figurative and literal prisoners of a regime.


And so the Kremlin’s victim par excellence receives an Oscar against the backdrop of a bloody war that Putin launched in Ukraine over a year ago. Yet Hollywood has, as it is prone to do, not gone beyond the surface — has not done its research.

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At A Hinterland Cemetery, Russians Mourn Their Sons And Stand By Putin

This is the other side of the Kremlin's "special operation" in Ukraine. The human cost of the Russian side remains unclear. The reportage takes place in the capital of one of the poorest regions of Russia, in the heart of the Caucasus, where a growing number of soldiers are buried.

VLADIKAVKAZ — Throughout Russia, military cemeteries continue to fill up and expand. Looking at the dates on the graves, one begins to gauge the scope of the Kremlin's so-called special military operation in Ukraine.

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"We will win this war," says Taïmouzar, 65. "It will be long. But we will make it all the way." .

At the foot of the Caucasus Mountains, Vladikavkaz is one of the poorest regions of Russia — a fertile ground for recruiters looking for volunteers to fight in Ukraine.

Looking at the grave of his son David, 21, the grieving father speaks with certainty: "He didn't want to fight this war," Taïmouzar says. "But he was right to go and fight there. A year ago, the Ukrainians were preparing to attack us. Russia had to defend itself."

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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Oleksandr Solonko

Bakhmut Diary: Death And Life From Inside Ukraine's 243rd Battalion

A 39-year-old fighter codenamed "Alaska," a member of the Ukrainian Battalion 243, has decided to share his story in the battles of Bakhmut and other key frontline positions in eastern Ukraine over the past six months.

Last fall, Ukraine’s 243rd Battalion fought in the early days of the battle for Bakhmut, which has become a decisive clash that continues to claim huge numbers of lives every day.

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The battalion held back the Russian advance near the towns of Klishchiivka and Opytny, under constant artillery fire. This is the story of how four of its fighters — Alaska, Dill, Wind and Braid — were completely surrounded in a closed hangar near Opytny. Cut off from their squad and under heavy artillery fire, they stood firm, even when it looked like all hope was lost.

The 39-year-old fighter codenamed "Alaska," whose real name is Viktor Bordyuzha, tells the story in his own words:

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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Yuri Fedorov

How Russia Planned For The Wrong War — With The Wrong Army

Russia is losing in Ukraine not just because of Putin's madness and the heroism of Ukrainians, but also because Russia's army is built for rapid invasion and occupation, not for the type of grinding war it is now fighting in Ukraine.

In the early days of the Russian invasion, both Moscow and the West predicted Ukraine would quickly be defeated.

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On Feb. 26, 2022, the American Institute for the Study of War wrote: “Russia will likely defeat Ukrainian regular military forces and secure their territorial objectives at some point in the coming days or weeks if Putin is determined to do so and willing to pay the cost in blood and treasure.”

Events, however, took a different path.

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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Emma Albright

Cannes v. Paris 2024: On The Difference Between Banning Russian Athletes Or Artists

While the IOC decides whether to let Moscow’s athletes compete in the 2024 Summer Games, Russian film directors will again be fighting for the right to show their films.

PARIS — Before the Cannes Film Festival started last May, festival officials said that, in light of the war in Ukraine, Russian delegations and anyone associated with the government were not welcome.

Still, one Russian director was invited to show his film at the festival: Kirill Serebrennikov, who made “Tchaikovsky's Wife,” had been an outspoken critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine.

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But his anti-Putin stance wasn’t enough for some. After his film premiered, an avalanche of criticism and calls to boycott all Russian films flooded the festival. At a press conference in Cannes, Serebrennikov said he understood the anger behind calls for total boycotts of Russians. But, he said, he did not agree with the “canceling” of a nation’s entire culture.

Cannes artistic director Thierry Fremaux defended the festival’s decision. “We don’t give in to political correctness, we don’t give in to cultural boycott,” he told Variety. “We go on a case-by-case basis.”

Now, France is asking similar questions about banning Russians with the 2024 Olympic games in Paris approaching.

In January, the International Olympics Committee (IOC) agreed that Russians could compete as neutral athletes, without their flag — a decision Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo recently said is unacceptable.

“As long as there is this war, this Russian aggression on Ukraine, it is not possible to pretend as though nothing has happened, to have a delegation that comes to Paris while the bombs continue to rain down on Ukraine,” Hidalgo told French public radio FranceInfo.

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Geopolitics
Pierre Haski

Why All Sides Are Calling For Peace Talks In Ukraine, And Nobody Means It

Russia says it's willing to negotiate for peace in Ukraine, but won't make any territorial concessions; meanwhile, China presents a half-baked peace plan. It's a masterclass in talking out of both sides of your mouth.

-Analysis-

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said this week that Russia was in favor of negotiation to end the war in Ukraine. But in the same breath, he added that there would be "no compromise" on what he described as "new territorial realities" — that is, the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine.

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A perfect example of how to say you are ready to negotiate, while also saying you are not.

This trickery neatly sums up the situation. At this stage, no one is truly prepared to negotiate, but at the same time, they must act as if they are, to avoid looking like the one standing in the way of peace. This applies to Russia, which is still trying to use force to take over the entire Donbas region — only some of which remains under its control.

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Geopolitics
Dominique Moïsi

Big Business, No Red Phone: Why U.S. v. China Is A Different Kind Of Cold War

To some, tensions between the U.S. and China look like a remake of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Yet the West's nemesis this time is more sophisticated and tied to us commercially in ways Moscow never was. There are, however, also new kinds of danger.

-Analysis-

PARIS If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck ... And yet. The relationship between China and the United States looks more and more like the Cold War of the past between the United States and the USSR, but it is something wholly different.

That difference of course begins with economic co-dependency. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached $690 billion in 2022 — a record — with a deficit that increased by $30 billion, to the detriment of the United States. The world, and even more its Asian neighbors, may be afraid of Chinese ambitions, but it is increasingly dependent on China economically — just as the Middle Kingdom depends, for its growth, on its foreign exchanges.

No, we are far from the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The destruction of the Chinese spy balloon may evoke the aerial incidents that preceded the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. And it is legitimate to wonder whether Taiwan will be a new Cuba. But, for the sake of historical rigor and geopolitical understanding – one must point out the significant differences between the “real” Cold War of yesterday and the “strange” Cold War of today.

First, Americans understood the USSR much better than they understand China. George Kennan's 1947 essay "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in Foreign Affairs, formulated the basis for the strategy of "containment." Today, in the United States (or elsewhere), there is no comparable analysis of China — no equivalent of this foundational text.

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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Serhii Baglai

The Lukashenko Method: How Long Can Belarus Keep Teasing The Russian Bear?

The regime in Belarus bet on a rapid Russian victory in Ukraine. But after a year of war, the armed forces of Belarus still haven't been ordered to attack. Why? Ukrainian publication Livy Bereg looks at Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's cunning game — and how much longer it can go on.

-Analysis-

KYIV — When it comes to his Russian neighbor, Alexander Lukashenko appears to be a walking contradiction: he is a firm supporter of the war in Ukraine, and yet continues to stand by his decision not to send troops.

And yet such an apparent anomaly is nothing new for the Belarus strongman: political scientists had already dubbed his leadership style "adaptive authoritarianism," whereby ruling elites in Minsk use opportunistic and pragmatic strategies to maintain power over time.

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This has largely succeeded since Lukashenko came to power in 1994, despite long-term predictions of the president’s imminent demise. Maneuvering between the EU and Russia and putting his eggs in different baskets, Lukashenko has managed not only to run the country like a collective farm, as some observers sometimes dismissively describe it, but also to adapt skillfully to new challenges.

The first sanctions against Belarus were imposed in 1996, in response to a fraudulent referendum that expanded presidential powers. But the EU lifted sanctions by 1999. The president, whose legitimacy was not recognized, released political prisoners, allowing relations between Belarus and Europe to warm.

Over the next decades of Lukashenko's tenure, a similar pattern was repeated many times. Another round of sanctions was imposed as a result of the rigged presidential election in 2010, then eased a few years later as Minsk offered its services in negotiations after the Russian annexation of Crimea.

After 2020, when Belarus was rocked by the largest protests in its history, many political commentators who were tempted to predict a long-awaited change of power were wrong in their assessments of the regime's stability. Lukashenko's ability to adapt was hugely underestimated.

Still, no dictatorship lasts forever.

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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Anna Akage

Hating Russians, Trusting Ourselves: The Hard Questions For Post-War Ukraine

A year after Russia's invasion of her homeland, Ukrainian writer Anna Akage looks back at recent history, but, above all, forward to a future where her nation must not only win the war, but not lose the victory.

-Essay-

It sure is nice to be on the right side of history. But ask anyone who is this "lucky," and they would gladly trade it for peace and security, for boredom, for some simple certainties about tomorrow.

I can't remember life in Ukraine ever being dull, say my mother and the people of her generation. Same for my grandmother and her neighbors — and my great-grandmother and those in her village said it too. No one remembers the last time we were bored in Ukraine, the last time we were focused on where to go for dinner or on vacation – to live, not just survive.

This is our country, our fate. They say every nation has its misfortune. Ukraine is unlucky with its geography: we have sea, mountains and precious fertile soil. Important trade routes traverse our country.

But to the northeast, we have a real-life Mordor, an inescapable evil neighbor with visions of world domination.

Revolution, war, famine. The terror of communism, then the hungry 1990s. Relative calm under Leonid Danylovych Kuchma that, alas, was not bound to last.

The Orange Revolution, students beaten, the Heavenly Hundred – martyrs of the 2014 revolution. Broken concrete, ashes, burning tires. A shattered helmet, covered in blood. Coffins. The Revolution of Dignity. Donbas, Crimea, Minsk, Ilovaysk. Checkpoints. "We didn't come here; we stayed here." And here we are, today. One full year. Like in a kaleidoscope. War.

Of course, we need to talk about yesterday. To analyze and draw conclusions, to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. But today, I want to look at tomorrow.

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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Konstantin Skorkin

Zelensky And The Delicate Task Of Tackling Corruption In Wartime

On the eve of Vladimir Putin's invasion, Volodymyr Zelensky was not a particularly popular figure in Ukraine. In the year since, he has achieved virtually universal support at home, and hero status abroad. What will the onetime anti-corruption crusader do with this political capital?

-Analysis-

KYIV — To understand Volodymyr Zelensky's spectacular rise, it's worth going back to his arrival on the political scene in Ukraine.

In the first round of the 2019 presidential elections, the well-known actor and comedian, and political novice, got 30% of the ballots, before rallying the entire protest vote in the second round to win with a sensational 73%. In May 2020, about 40% of Ukrainians supported Zelensky’s presidency. By 2021, that support had dropped by 10 percentage points, and by the beginning of Feb. 2022, he could claim on 24.6% support.

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Zelensky’s rating was affected by the inevitable disappointment of inflated expectations, as well as personnel failures, unpopular land reforms, rising utility bills and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

One of his key promises — peace in the Donbas — remained unfulfilled. Despite a short détente in the summer and autumn of 2019, the Kremlin demonstrated that it did not intend to give in to Kyiv’s demands. Similarly, the Ukrainian public made clear that they were not ready to make concessions to the aggressor.

The Russian invasion of Feb. 24 changed everything. Zelensky went from fading president to supreme commander, leading a nation at war.

In the first days of the war, support for the Ukrainian president shot up to 91%. Zelensky refusal of offers from Western allies to move abroad for safety, and instead remain in Kyiv, then under attack by Russia, played a key role.

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