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FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Report: After Wagner Group, Now Russia's Official Military Is Recruiting Prisoners For War
If Wagner recruiters looked for strong, ruthless killers and fighters, the defense ministry is willing to take anyone, regardless of age, health or criminal record.
Founder and leader of the Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Russian prison recruiters "grab anyone"
“It's been a week of hiring inmates in the Tula region colony. More than 200 people have signed up. It's f***ed up! They grab anyone: the blind, the lame, the disabled, those who can barely move their legs and the elderly, who are long out of their minds – even those diagnosed with schizophrenia. And this even though in 2022 more than 200 convicts were already removed from the colony (this is the fourth wave)," sources tell Gulagu.net.
The fighters are likely to be ineffective – but brutal.
Similar stories have been reported from other regions of the country. In propaganda played on TV in Russian prisons, the war is described as a great opportunity for prisoners, recently released Yuli Boyarshinov reports: “Everything is great. (Russia is on) the offensive on all fronts; you can get a cool, interesting experience. Two hundred thousand a month. You must go. A few people are critical of this information, or say that this is not the whole truth. Maybe five percent of the convicts think about this information critically," says Boyarshinov, who had been imprisoned since 2018 on terrorism charges.
Ukrainian observers say that even if Russia’s new recruitment campaign is a success, the fighters are likely to be ineffective – but brutal.
“This embittered herd came to us. These militant groups are trying to ‘free’ us. Pathological ferocity is cultivated … in the Russian army, and the results of this education are seen on the battlefields, temporarily occupied territories, and everywhere. But once in captivity, the Russians find themselves in a completely incomprehensible environment, where they, the captives, are treated better than in their units," says Viktor Kevlyuk, an expert at the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies.
Geopolitics
Heihe Postcard: Where The China-Russia "Friendship Of Convenience" Reveals Its Limits
Heihe and Blagovechtchensk have been a symbol of the Sino-Russian rapprochement, which was underscored by Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent visit to Moscow. Only 500 meters apart, the two cities are the only ones to face each other on the 3,500 kilometers of shared border.
Broken streets, ghostly calm
After the border re-opened in 1989, the poor village of Heihe benefited from trade with Russia, growing to more than 200,000 people. The street names in Heihe are written in Chinese and Russian, and Chinese store signs are also written in Cyrillic. Russian dolls adorn the parks and some buildings are topped with Orthodox domes. The inhabitants of "Blago" used to cross the border on weekends for shopping, cheap health care, entertainment and business.
But the COVID-19 pandemic turned everything upside down. China's borders were closed for three years, and the city of Heihe increased the number of lockdowns under the country's relentless zero Covid policy. "The Russians who used to live here all went back to their countries during COVID," says one resident.
Heihe has the air of a city in decline.
In Nov. 2021, local authorities promised a 100,000 yuan ($14,555) reward for information on the origin of the emergence of a few dozen COVID-19 cases. Vigilance on the banks of the Amur River has been stepped up for fear of a return of the virus from Russia by smugglers, poachers or cross-border fishermen.
China may have turned its back on zero Covid this winter and reopened its borders, but Heihe remains immersed in a ghostly calm, with the air of a city in decline.
The city's tall buildings may tower over the relatively flat Russian city opposite, but behind them, they hide broken streets and closed businesses. On the peninsula, the large three-story shopping complex, once popular with Russian shoppers looking for furs or clothes, is only partially open on the first floor. A few kilometers away, stray dogs run through the free trade zone.
Ice racing event part of the Russian-Chinese winter sports festival on the frozen Amur River.
Rare traffic
If trade between China and Russia has increased since the beginning of the war in Ukraine (+30% in 2022, up to $190 billion), Heihe hasn't benefited. The first bridge linking the two countries is still little used. Where more than 600 trucks can theoretically travel every day, only five brand-new construction machines are heading for Russia when we pass by.
The huge customs clearance parking lot on the Chinese side is almost deserted. On the side of the road leading to the bridge, new trucks are parked for several hundred meters. "The drivers are waiting for their visas to be able to take them to Russia," explains Sacha. Traffic is even more scarce in the Russia-China direction.
As the bridge is reserved for freight, it is on a hovercraft that the Chinese and Russians have to cross the frozen Amur River. The border post reopened only a few weeks ago and is still rarely used. In the customs hall, Mrs. Lin is helping about fifteen young Chinese to complete the last formalities. Originally from the province of Guangxi, in the south of China, they are going to work in a gold mine for a few months, says one, the manager of a travel agency. Nearby, Zhihan, a 26-year-old economics student, is preparing to join the University of Blagovechtchensk after months of distance learning. Visas have not yet been issued for Chinese tourists.
In the opposite direction, arrivals are trickling in. In early March, Russian authorities urged Chinese officials to simplify procedures, lamenting that only a few drivers, entrepreneurs, and officials are allowed to enter China. Russian tourists are still not allowed to return to Heihe.
"Window to the world"
Heihe traders are waiting not only for the return of Russians but also for Chinese tourists who, before Covid, went to the border town to escape the pollution of the industrial cities in the north of the country and to offer themselves "a window on the foreign world."
Hope is slowly returning to the sleepy little town.
"They will come back when the temperature rises again," hopes an idle saleswoman at the supermarket Epinduo, the largest retailer of Russian products including chocolate, vodka and beer. After having fallen to -40°C in the middle of winter, the thermometer is still close to 0°C.
Hope is slowly returning to the sleepy little town. Sitting at Luna, a famous Russian restaurant in the city, a businessman working in logistics has come from Shenzhen (in the far south of China) to ask about the opening of the border. "Europe is no longer doing business with Russia, so we're taking advantage of it," his local partner said. China does not seem to be helping Russia directly to get around the sanctions, but Chinese suppliers have stepped up to fill the gap left by the departure of Western groups.
This is the first highway bridge connecting China and Russia across the Heilongjiang River.
"Pivot" to the East
Russia's "pivot" to the East, which began several years ago, has been accompanied by infrastructure projects along the border with China. In addition to the freight bridge, a cable car linking Heihe and Blagovechtchensk is due to be completed in 2023. And 500 kilometers to the east, a cross-border railway bridge is scheduled to start operation in August.
The huge "Power of Siberia 1" pipeline, which went into operation in 2019, runs a few kilometers from Blagovechtchensk, with an extension on the Chinese side from Heihe to Shanghai. The pipeline is to be twinned by the 2,600-kilometer-long "Power of Siberia 2," which will completely divert Russian gas flows from Europe to China.
In the Amur River region, the Sino-Russian relationship has always oscillated between mistrust and cooperation. On the Russian side, the sight of the tall buildings of Heihe has reinforced the feeling of the inhabitants of "Blago" that the Chinese city has been built on their backs.
This asymmetrical relationship is combined with a nagging fear of the inevitable Sinification of this region, which is marked by a strong demographic imbalance: some 32 million people live in the northern province of Heilongjiang, compared with some 8 million in the huge Russian federal district of the Far East.
The local Russian authorities have long dragged their feet over the road bridge project launched some 30 years ago, fearing a "yellow peril." Orchestrated by the Kremlin, the economic shift to the East has its limits in this territory, which is rich in natural resources but has long lacked infrastructure.
The Cossack "purification"
On the Chinese side, mistrust is also the order of the day. On the banks of the Heihe River, where the Russian flag flies on the other side of the river, Mrs. Wang doesn't have to be pushed very hard to let off steam about the neighbors across the river. "The Russians drink a lot and are not very hardworking," says the grandmother, wrapped in her parka. And half-heartedly, while looking at the Amur River, she says: "There was a massacre here. Go and see the Ahui museum."
Located a few kilometers away, this museum announces its colors at the entrance. "Here, it is forbidden to Russians. Show me your passport," a ticket office employee asks the foreigner passing by. Inside, reconstructions, with light and sound effects, recall the terrible violence caused by the Cossacks during the conquest of the Amur basin.
In 1858, the "unequal" Treaty of Aigun set the Sino-Russian border on the Amur River, forcing the Qing Empire to cede 1 million square kilometers to St. Petersburg. In 1900, the Cossacks decided to rid the Russian part of the Amur of all Chinese, throwing into the river or massacring some 5,000 people.
On the banks of the Amur River, Russia is no longer feared.
This past is still very much alive in Heihe. But when it comes to current relations, residents interviewed have no hesitation: "The Russians are our friends," says a cab driver. "We don't forget the past, but that shouldn't affect our good relations today," adds Mingze, a young man from Heihe who is visiting the museum with his girlfriend. He added that the Japanese invaders "were much crueler than the Russians."
In Heihe, the opinion expressed publicly on Russia or the war in Ukraine does not stray far from Beijing's official position: discreet about the "crisis" in Ukraine (the word "war" is banned), with little acknowledgement of Russian atrocities. The inhabitants' views also reflect their opinion of another superpower: the great American enemy.
Beijing and Moscow have come together to denounce "American hegemony," and China accuses NATO of having pushed Russia into conflict to defend its borders. "We have to help each other against the Americans," says one resident. "The United States is not friendly with China," another says. "The Americans brought COVID-19 to China and it is because of them that we have been confined for so long," Wang says.
On the banks of the Amur River, Russia is no longer feared. "We are a strong country now," Mingze continues.
Russia is seen not as a potential invader, but as a friend of circumstance in the conflict with an increasingly hostile U.S. In the museum, the voiceover of a staged scene of past atrocities concludes that Russian-Chinese relations are peaceful today, but that China must remain vigilant. "We must learn a lesson from history: if you lag behind, you will be defeated."
Russia
Iran And Russia, An Alliance Of Common Enemies — Sealed By Sanctions
Russia was becoming increasingly anti-Western, and Iran could use it for its advantage. And most importantly, as a result of Ibrahim Raisi's victory in the presidential election, the influence of the Iranian pragmatists, who have always been more critical of Russia, was minimized.
The resulting tandem of Raisi and Khamenei made a clear decision: we work with Russia. And the war in Ukraine was a catalyst: it simply accelerated the ongoing processes because, on the Russian side, there was also a need for closer cooperation with Iran.
In the same trench
Iran began to seem helpful to Russia in the early 2010s, with the war in Syria, as well as the negotiations around nuclear power. Since 2010 — when Russia supported international sanctions against Iran — things have shifted to the current position. Some experts think that Moscow believes that the Iranians can theoretically be allowed to possess nuclear weapons as long as they do not test them openly.
Russia lifted sanctions on Iran because they were mainly concerned about a ban on deliveries of S-300 missiles, which had already happened long before. The sanctions had been a signal in response to Iran creating a uranium enrichment plant behind Russia's back. When the Fordow facility was suddenly discovered in 2009, Moscow became irritated and joined the sanctions.
But the Russian leadership was never in favour of sanctions. Russian companies, on the other hand, were tied to the West and afraid to work with Iran. But after the war in Ukraine started, Russian companies found themselves in the same sanctions trench as Iranian businesses. This became a favorable condition for the development of trade and economic cooperation.
Today's enemies, tomorrow's friends
Russian-Iranian relations are an example of how friends can be made and lost quickly. Even since the collapse of the USSR, things have changed several times.
In the 1990s, cooperation with Iran saved several sectors of the Russian economy. The Iranians were willing to pay money; some agreements promised close collaboration by the 2000s. But the Russian elite did not perceive Iran as a potential partner. For them, Iran was a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West.
For example, the 1996-1998 treaties with the United States implied that Russia would refuse to cooperate with Iran in exchange for closer cooperation with the United States. The signing of these treaties significantly undermined Russia's relations with Iran.
The traditional beliefs of the Islamic Republic may appeal to the Russian leadership.
Then, things changed as Russia-U.S. relations evolved. First, there was a friendship with Iran, then Iran was declared the leading problem in the region. In 2007, during Putin's first visit to Iran, one of the main tasks of Russian diplomacy was to ensure that no document approved by Iran contained Putin's signature. They even invented a format of joint statements by the two presidents that were "unsigned" so as not to offend anyone in the West, recalls Kozhanov.
But as relations with the U.S. deteriorated, Moscow gradually began to understand that Iran is also important in its own right: as an assistant to Syria, a country with overlapping interests in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf.
The facts that Iran never officially supported Chechen separatism and that it helped to reconcile participants of the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s also played a role. The development of conservative ideas in Russia is appealing to the Iranian leadership, and the traditional beliefs of the Islamic Republic may appeal to the Russian leadership.
Together against sanctions
Iran has much experience circumventing sanctions, managing to move fluidly within the Persian Gulf region. There have long been established supply windows through the UAE, Oman, and, to a lesser extent, Qatar.
Iran plays the role of a transit hub. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is developing quickly. This is the first project that Russia and Iran began to discuss after the sanctions and the outbreak of war in 2022.
In general, infrastructure is now coming to the forefront of Russian-Iranian cooperation. Discussions are going on in the expert community — right up to completely crazy ideas about creating a standard route from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Tehran and Bandar Abbas, the Iranian port city in the Persian Gulf.
The two countries are in the same trench in many respects because they have to.
In addition, several agreements have been signed on bilateral cooperation, for example, on repairing Russian aircraft in Iran. Many experts are sure that this is an excuse for the possibility of importing spare parts to Russia or replacing them in Iran because the Iranians are good at repairing both Boeing and Airbus but cannot produce spare parts themselves.
The Soviets demonstrated that stealing technology and creatively refining it is quite a possible way to develop. But, of course, the sanctions imposed on both countries will limit cooperation.
There is also the option of expanding cooperation to third countries, that is, the involvement of China, India, and other players. In this way, the financial problem could be solved, though only partially.
The future looks unclear
Iran believes the world order is now changing and will result in the death of the U.S. empire. And in the process of restructuring, Russia can help Iran integrate into new alliances, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union. This would involve the removal of trade barriers as well as the strengthening of Iran's position in the international arena.
But Kozhanov says that he does not believe a long-lasting alliance will be established. Many in Iran oppose a rapprochement with Russia, because they are well aware that it is the Iranians who are paying the price for this rapprochement. If before the Ukraine war, what constituted a problem was the infrastructure related to the nuclear program, now, theoretically, their entire military infrastructure is under scrutiny.
Moreover, when Iran's leadership changes, it is unclear how a new regime will behave toward Russia. And the Russian leadership is also ambiguous in its perception of Iran.
The two countries are in the same trench in many respects because they have to. There is simply no alternative to their cooperation right now. If the global split is prolonged (and it looks like it is), we will see further steps by Iran and Russia toward rapprochement, concludes Kozhanov. But for now, it is too early to know.
FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Ukraine Blacklist: Shaming The Companies Still Doing Business With Russia
The list includes 26 companies, including one from Germany: Metro. The Düsseldorf-based retail giant continues to do business in Russia. By doing so, says the Ukrainian government, Metro is making the Kremlin a lot of money.
Circumventing sanctions
A Metro spokesman told Die Welt that the group has an independent business in both Russia and Ukraine and has publicly condemned Russia's war in no uncertain terms on several occasions. "Since the beginning of the war, we as Metro have focused on supporting Ukraine as well as maintaining our operational business there," the spokesman added.
Last year, Metro donated about 523 tons of food and 49 tons of personal care and household chemicals to the population and the army. The spokesman did not comment on criticism from Kyiv that Metro was helping to finance Putin's military campaign.
More than 200 have continued, business-as-usual.
So far, more than 1,000 companies voluntarily have withdrawn from Russia or significantly reduced their presence, according to a major study by the U.S. university Yale. But more than 200 have continued with business-as-usual, the U.S. researchers said, at least to the extent allowed by international sanctions.
The Ukrainian blacklist lists four companies from China. This is not surprising. The EU also believes Beijing is secretly helping Russia.
Earlier this month, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU Commission, said that several companies registered in China were involved in evading sanctions. They supplied sensitive goods from the EU to Russia via third countries. What those are, she did not say. But Commission officials have spoken in the past of so-called dual-use goods, products that have both civilian and military uses, such as drones, aircraft parts or computer chips.
Oleksandr Novikov arriving at the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) for interrogation.
Olena Khudiakova/Ukrinform
Canned vegetables and razors
The blacklist also includes several Greek shipping companies. According to the NACP, they transport Russian oil and may be doing so in violation of EU sanctions.
At the end of last year, Brussels decided on an oil price cap, which means that European shipping companies are no longer allowed to deliver Russian crude oil to third countries unless the price per barrel is below $60.
Procter & Gamble operates a large plant for Gillette razors in St. Petersburg.
Even if the companies are not directly violating sanctions, they still play a role. For example, France's Bonduelle, which produces mainly canned vegetables and salad mixes, is also on the list. By staying on in Russia — according to Ukraine — the company continues to pay taxes there, thus pumping money into the state's coffers.
The same goes for Procter & Gamble from the USA. The company operates a large plant for Gillette razors in St. Petersburg, for example. Canned vegetables and razors are thus suddenly becoming the focus of world politics. This keeps 27 foreign ministers and their diplomats in Brussels busy.
But if Ukraine puts a company on the blacklist, it does not mean that it is actually circumventing sanctions or supplying prohibited goods to Russia. It merely means that Ukraine suspects they do. Or it may just mean that the company has a significant Russian business, which is not illegal per se.
The list is nevertheless explosive. It is a case of "name and shame", of public denunciation with potentially devastating consequences for the companies' reputations.
What's next? No one in Brussels believes that the blacklist will actually lead to penalties against the companies in the near future.
Nevertheless, the pushback is big. The Greek government, it is said, will only agree to new sanctions if the country's shipping companies disappear from the list. And Hungary is upset that the bank OTP is being called a "sponsor of war" and is also threatening to block the move — not a good prospect for sanctions package number 11 from Brussels.
Geopolitics
A Key New Ally For Russia That Makes The West Cringe: Tunisia
Authoritarian drift
The day before the Russian delegation’s arrival, the European Parliament had published a press release announcing it “would not observe the electoral process” in December 2022, in a break with its usual position: Brussels’ parliamentarians had followed the elections of 2011, 2014, 2018 and 2019.
It was symptomatic of a growing distance between Saïed and his Western partners, who are increasingly questioning the Head of State’s management of the country. Already in July 2022, the head of American diplomacy Antony Blinken said he was preoccupied by “the erosion of the respect of democratic standards” in Tunisia, following the low turnout recorded for the referendum on the new constitution project.
When principles and interests come into conflict, interests take the upper hand.
Over the months, criticism of Saïed’s authoritarianism has multiplied on the American side, but also in Europe: the German government, for example, declared itself to be “very worried” following the wave of arrests of February 2023, while the European Parliament passed, one month later, a resolution condemning the “authoritarian drift of president Saïed”.
For Slim Laghmani, law professor at the University of Tunis, if the European Union’s position stays the same and no sanctions have yet been made, it’s because Brussels and the member states cannot afford to completely forsake the Tunisian government.
“Generally speaking, when principles and interests come into conflict, interests take the upper hand,” says the professor. “We maintain an in-between position, expressing our concern about political developments in Tunisia, but while making sure to avoid an economic collapse of Tunisia that would destabilize the European Union.”
Moscow's influence in Africa
For its part, the Tunisian government has multiplied its declarations aimed directly at the West, keeping up especially with anti-imperialist rhetoric. In April and May 2022, Kaïs Saïd explained in several declarations that he will fight “any form of interference”, in response to American and European criticism of the referendum organization.
In this context, the rapprochement with new international partners begs several questions. It is not the first time Tunisia is looking for support outside of Europe or the United States: cooperative measures with Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Turkey have, for example, increased in the last few years.
However, maintaining ties with these countries is nowhere near as worrying for the West as a rapprochement with Moscow. Even before the beginning of the war in Ukraine, several European powers － with France at the front － excoriated the growing Russian influence in several African countries. Since the start of the conflict in Europe, the West is alarmed by the complacency with which some African Head of States treat Russia, such as the Malian junta leader Assimi Goïta or South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.
Kaïs Saïed’s Tunisian government has for its part boosted Russia’s place in national diplomacy. The authorities were preparing to welcome his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in early February 2023. The visit ended up being canceled at the last minute, officially for security reasons. However, Slim Laghmani recalls that “the press mentioned American pressure on Tunisia”, a theory that the professor considers credible and which alludes to “a preventive act on the part of the U.S.”.
Members of Tunisia's Independent High Authority for Elections welcoming a Russian delegation in Tunis on Dec. 16, 2022.
All eyes on Tunis
For the Kremlin, Saïed appears like a new and unique partner from a historical point of view. Officially non-aligned but firmly anti-Soviet under Bourguiba, then openly turned towards the U.S. with Ben Ali, Tunisia has long remained closed to cooperation with Russia.
After the revolution, the relationship timidly deepened. The first official visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tunis took place in 2014, but no major partnership was established. With Kaïs Saïed, Tunisia is more open than ever to Moscow’s ambitions.
It is worth remembering that Russia has been nurturing projects in the Maghreb for years now, and is already present on the Tunisian border. A strategic partner of Algeria since the Cold War, ties between the two countries show no sign of abating. Russia is also present on the other side of the border, in the eastern part of Libya, where the Warner group mercenaries support Marshal Haftar’s forces.
In the Maghreb and elsewhere, Moscow leans mostly on its military power to seal ties, offering the services of its private military companies, organizing the military training of the partner countries’ armed forces and selling military equipment. Russia thus became the first weapon supplier in Africa in the 2018-2022 period, totaling 40% of weapon imports on the continent.
In Tunisia, the cooperation has yet to take this shape. A military partnership with Russia would lead to a complete paradigm shift and make Moscow a major ally, which is far from being the case at present. “These are choices that cannot be taken lightly,” says Slim Laghmani, for whom such an agreement would be an “extremely serious decision”. But, step by step, Russia discreetly expands its influence in the country.
Culture and tourism
First, culturally, Moscow is working on promoting its image in Tunisia. The Maison Russe in Tunis, for example, a cultural center under the embassy's patronage, focused until recently on organizing Russian language courses. Since last year, it has broadened its activities to other topics and with new frameworks, particularly in schools.
Russian tourists are seen as saviors of the sector.
Since January, the Maison Russe organizes high school visits in Russian-speaking classes. These actions with students obviously help to strengthen academic cooperation, and the Maison Russe also helps students who want to obtain scholarships to study in Russia. “This year, we went from 17 to 40 scholarships granted,” says a translator working for the Maison. The Maison Russe highlights that it is an “apolitical” institution, receiving “few directives” from the embassy.
Another indirect lever of cultural rapprochement is tourism. After the 2015 terrorist attacks and the desertion of hotels by Europeans, Russian tourists are seen as saviors of the sector.
Impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and then by the closure of almost all foreign trade links at the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian outbound tourism is now in full recovery. The national Russian company Aeroloft has announced the resumption of flights to Tunisia and will be serving the Enfidha-Hammamet airport starting May 30, 2023.
Traditional diplomacy
Moscow can also bank on traditional diplomacy to expand its influence in Russia. From this point of view, the offensive seems much more obvious, especially with the substitution in January 2022 of the former ambassador Sergey Nikolaev.
In the post in Tunis since 2015 but rather discreet, one of his last noteworthy successes was the support of the partnership in the spatial industry between the two countries. One of the highlights of this project was the launch, in March 2021, of Challenge One, the first Tunisian satellite, from the Russia spaceport of Baikonour.
The profile of his substitute, Aleksander Zolotov, seems much more fit to the rapprochement work with Kaïs Saïed’s government. Arabic-speaking and real connoisseur of the Maghreb, and ambassador of the Russian Federation in Algeria between 2011 and 2017, he has been multiplying actions of a new symbolic scale since the beginning of his term. Case in point, the opening of a memorial for Russian soldiers who fought in the First World War in Menzel-Bourguiba in north Tunisia last March － the only one of its kind in North Africa.
Russian ballet at a cultural center in the El Menzah suburb of Tunis
The Kremlin’s media offensive
Just like in the Sahel or in Central Africa, Russia can mainly count on its communication strategy to make its voice heard in Tunisia. For example, in the last few weeks, the Kremlin’s main news agency, Sputnik, has multiplied the publications referencing, more or less directly, Tunisia.
“Maybe the news in Tunisia play in this sense,” says Kamal Louadj, journalist and Russian-Algerian correspondent for the agency for almost seven years. For the past year, he has devoted himself to Sputnik Africa, the French-language version of the website. Previously aimed at French and Belgian audiences, the agency was banned from broadcasting in Europe at the beginning of the war in Ukraine and chose to realign its content towards French-speaking African readers, according to Kamal Louadj.
Sputnik Africa also targets the West explicitly in its publications. In an interview published on April 13, a former officer of the Tunisian National Guard described NATO’s military support to Ukraine as a “nightmare for Africa.”
Not ready to make way for Russia
For now, the complete shift of Tunisia towards Russia seems complicated. First, from a financial standpoint. In terms of bilateral loans, France ($2.6 billion) and Saudi Arabia ($2 billion) are by far Tunisia’s main partners. As the Head of State’s priority is to find new lenders, the Russian war economy seems much unable to offer a viable alternative. “It’s enough to see the Russian GDP,” says Slim Laghmani.
Chinese presence in Africa has been identified as a threat by the U.S. for several years.
The alternative to the West may come from China, much more active than Moscow in Africa’s financial sector, and already present in Tunisia for a few years. Recently, Beijing positioned itself as a direct rival to Tunisia’s Western partners. Following the European Parliament’s resolution, the Chinese ambassador to Tunisia spoke out against any form of “interference” in the country, echoing Kaïs Saïed’s words. Chinese presence in Africa has also been identified as a threat by the U.S. for several years.
However, even if Tunisia were to find new partners outside the Western camp, the cooperation on other sovereign issues would remain more than uncertain. Supported by Emmanuel Macron and Giorgia Meloni on border security, Kaïs Saïed has no qualms about accepting their help. As for defense issues, the U.S. remains the main partner of the Tunisian armed forces.
The only cloud on the horizon is the planned reduction in the aid program to secure the country’s borders, in a context of tensions with Kaïs Saïed’s government. Yet, it is precisely by deconstructing its position as an essential defense partner that the U.S. could potentially open the field to other players. “Nature abhors a vacuum,” says Slim Laghmani. But the legal expert explains, however, that despite the erosion of its partnership with Tunisia, “the Americans are not ready to make way for Russia” in the country. For now.
FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Drones On Moscow: Vladimir Putin On The Defensive Like Never Before
Russia finally has a success to brag about — but Ukraine keeps the initiative
The impact of the Moscow strikes is first and foremost political, which was undoubtedly the goal of those who sent this swarm of drones. Ukraine has denied all responsibility, just like the previous incursion, of a drone shot above the Kremlin.
Putin briefly reacted yesterday, claiming, without any proof, that the Russian air defense had worked as intended. He accused Kyiv of wanting to “terrorize” — his word — the population of Moscow. Surely, this is a cynical statement from a man who has been bombing Ukrainian cities for weeks — and particularly recently, including the capital.
The paradox is that Vladimir Putin is now on the defensive, even though he can finally brag about a few military successes: in Bakhmut, where Russian forces pushed Ukrainians out of the city after nearly a year of fighting, and the bombing of the Ukrainian Intelligence’s headquarters, which was recently acknowledged by Kyiv.
But Ukraine still manages to keep the initiative, between a recent marine drone attack in the Black Sea, the incursion of Russian rebels in Belgorod, inside Russia, and now, drones on Moscow.
High stakes for Ukraine
By multiplying these operations on many different fronts and in many different ways, the Ukrainian army is covering its tracks as it prepares a counteroffensive. This attack has been the object of so much speculation in the past weeks that it was necessary to confuse the enemy so that they cannot know where the Ukrainian army will strike.
Ukraine is playing for high stakes with this counteroffensive.
The tactic worked well last year: Kyiv said for weeks that an attack was being prepared in Kherson, in southern Ukraine, only to retake entire swathes of the north-east territory. It will be hard to pull that off twice.
Ukraine is playing for high stakes with this counteroffensive, which is being prepared in an important international context. European leaders meet this week in Moldova, probably with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky himself. And a NATO summit, at the beginning of July in Vilnius, Lithuania, will be a key date for the future of the conflict. Weapons deliveries, security guarantees and political coordination: Ukraine will want to arrive in Vilnius in a position of strength — and it will all play out first on the field of battle.
FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
Why Russia Is Now Betting On A Long War In Ukraine
The results and consequences of this war also depend on these two factors.
Best of the worst
The Russian blitzkrieg failed. Now the Kremlin has gone to the other extreme — a protracted conflict. Waging a long war is not the goal of Moscow because they must realize that they cannot afford a long war. However, their military-political leadership is forced to adapt to the situation that it created: the professional pre-war army is practically defeated, the professional personnel is less than half of what it was before the invasion, the best and latest combat equipment has been lost, there are fewer combat-ready vehicles in the reserves than those that already out of order.
Gaining time is the main Russian reason to drag out the war.
Against this background, the goal of the war is clearly visible — to dismantle Ukrainian statehood and maintain geopolitical control over its territory. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin will need new efforts, the preparation of which requires the restoration of combat-ready groups, and this takes time. Gaining time is the main Russian reason to drag out the war.
And the Kremlin constantly falls into the same trap, taking half-measures instead of general mobilization. According to the Russian army, aggressive advertising of military service, aimed at the poorest sections of the population, allows you to work with 4-5 million people burdened with loans and other material problems, which will become a group of 800,000 people. That is, there is even an opportunity to choose the best of the worst.
Ukrainian volunteers on a break during a military training program in Kyiv.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive
The Kremlin launched a powerful information operation, trying to break the unity of the countries that supported Ukraine in its struggle, primarily the EU countries, by promoting the narratives of "tactical nuclear weapons", "ceasefire", "long war". One of the goals of this operation is to buy time to recover and build up their potential.
On the other side of the scale is the Ukrainian counter-offensive. It should be understood that the stamp "counteroffensive" means a whole range of operations: offensive, defensive, special, information-psychological, stabilization, the ultimate goal of which is to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The sooner it is launched, the less time our enemy will have to restore its potential to continue the armed hostilities.
That is why every weapons delivery makes the war cheaper and shorter. It is clear that for the West, the current difficulties in supplying what we need are temporary, while for Russia, the limitation of military potential is insurmountable or can be eliminated only in the long term.
Instead, the West must reformat and revive its defense industry to ensure a series of successive operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, plan for constant supplies to compensate for their losses and restore combat capability. Helping Ukraine achieve a decisive victory as soon as possible is a better investment in security than allowing Russia to achieve its goals at least partially.
Another version of the protracted war
Any territory of Ukraine that remains under the control of Russia will later become a springboard for new aggression. Freezing the war without the full return of the territory of Ukraine under its control will only increase the time interval between aggressions. That is another version of the protracted war.
The Russian Federation turns any occupied territory into a military base. An example is the occupied Donbas. The world, being half-heartedly worried, allowed the invaders to keep what they had seized and eight years later there is a full-scale war. The attempts to put the Russian Federation at the negotiating table immediately after the Ukrainian counter-offensive will lead to the same dead end.
During the year, the Kremlin only imitated its desire to seek agreement, a strategic goal unattainable for the Russian Federation and in the future will not allow changing its strategy. And here is the icing on this cake: imagine that the West bowed to the Kremlin's demands for fear of nuclear blackmail.
And now let's guess what conclusions China will draw from this lesson? And this is a very significant factor not to push Ukraine to sign any agreements with the Russian Federation, except for the document on the complete and unconditional surrender of Moscow. The means of armed hostilities used by the Kremlin to destroy the Ukrainian nation leave us no other choice.
President Vladimir Putin during a May 2 meeting from the National Congress Palace in Saint Petersburg.
Long-term consequences
In the long term, Russia has a chance to keep what it has seized in Ukraine, to recover enough to resume the offensive in Ukraine. This is a completely different level of armed confrontation in Europe, which will create new threats and challenges for the U.S. partners in NATO.
And these challenges will have to be responded to. To this should be added Russian attempts to control Belarus, develop its expansion into Moldova and, possibly, the Baltic states. The Russian Federation will certainly resume hostilities in Ukraine sooner or later, but this will already be subject to U.S. obligations to NATO partners.
The post-war architecture of security in Europe, and possibly in the world, directly depends on the victory of Ukraine, which will determine the distribution of forces. Therefore, the US and the West not only have the resources to influence the outcome of the war but are also capable of doing so.
It is here that the basic building blocks of the future world security system are laid – providing assistance to Ukraine in maintaining sovereignty will make it impossible in the long term for another Russian aggression against our country.
*Viktor Kevlyuk is a fellow at the Centre for Defense Strategies.
FOCUS: Russia-Ukraine War
How The Belgorod Incursion Exposes Deep Vulnerability Inside Russia's Military
"The next step — men will start to collect their guns and defend themselves, and this will be the collapse of the state."
Russian intel breakdown
Military analyst Yury Fedorov agrees. He assesses the readiness of Russian security services to cope with such attacks as zero. "The Border Guard Service, part of the FSB [Federal Security Service], is responsible for border security. Foremost, of course, this is a failure of the FSB," the expert says.
Russians need to have additional forces, which will have to be taken from the front.
Given that the number of attackers is about a hundred people, one or two battalions could have handled them. According to Fedorov, it was impossible to do it quickly, not because of the lack of reserves but because of the inability to conduct such operations.
Even Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, responding to citizens' questions about the "porous border", said: "I have even more questions than you do about the Ministry of Defense, so I don't want to comment.
Analyst Kirill Mikhailov believes that responsibility also lies with Russian intelligence, which overlooked the preparations for the attack.
"The attackers had tanks plus an infantry company. That's quite a serious force, and the Russians had to notice all this at the border," he said.
However, Mikhailov considers the main problem to be the low data transmission and response speed: "It is the bane of the Russian army. As we can see now, there are at least certain areas where the border is covered exceptionally poorly. And to change this situation somehow, the Russians need to have additional forces, which will have to be taken from the front, which is most likely what the Ukrainian command is trying to do with such measures."
Preparations for a counteroffensive?
Sources for Vazhnyye Istorii close to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the FSB also believe that one goal of the action was hype as well as an attempt to draw additional Russian army forces from the front to pull reserves. "The Belgorod operation could have been an attempt to confuse and divert Russian forces and resources as part of Ukraine's preparations for a large-scale offensive. But it did not work. No one paid much attention to it," commented the source.
Many of these measures were for show — a kind of security theater.
All Russian experts point out that the defenses created along the border with Ukraine, the so-called "siege line" (that cost 10 billion rubles), proved useless. "Many of these measures were for show — a kind of security theater to demonstrate to the local population the seriousness of the situation," Mikhailov says.
On Monday, Andrei Yusov, a spokesman for the central intelligence directorate of the Ukrainian military forces, stressed that only Russian citizens were involved in the operation. Later, Mikhail Podolyak, advisor to the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, wrote that Ukraine was not directly involved in the attack, which was organized by "underground guerrilla units" consisting of Russian citizens.
A source close to the FSB told Vazhnyye Istorii that the quality of Ukraine's intelligence actions is highly regarded in the security services. "They circumvent Western bans on strikes against Russia with the help of this unit, which allegedly includes only Russians," he said. The Russian state security agencies consider such methods effective for Ukraine.
Former Ukrainian army officer and analyst Roman Svitan is confident that the Russian command will now have to redeploy forces from Ukrainian territory to the border areas.
"So far, for Ukrainian troops, the development of events is going in the right direction," he says. "The density of Russian troops in the supposed directions of our strike is decreasing."
featured-post
Russians Or Ukrainians — Or Both? Attacks Inside Russia Are A Major Escalation
These fighters belong to two organizations that are regularly in the news. The first one is the “Russian Volunteer Corps” and the other is the “Freedom of Russia Legion”. The first is reputed to be on the far-right, led by Dmitriy Nikitin, a former martial arts teacher. The second is without known affiliation. Both were once incorporated in the Ukrainian army, but now declare to be acting independently.
Conquering or creating a diversion?
Despite Kyiv’s denial, it seems impossible that these rather marginal groups were able to set up such an operation without the support and green light of the army or of Ukrainian secret services. In fact, Kyiv reproduces methods used by Russians since the beginning of the war in Donbass in 2014: so-called independent forces that are equipped and armed by Moscow.
Ukrainians have been hinting for weeks that they will launch a counter-offensive.
The real question is the goal of this operation. Is it really about conquering a “freed zone” in Russian territory, which would require significant support from Ukraine? Or is it simply to create a diversion?
Ukrainians have been hinting for weeks that they will launch a counter-offensive to try to break through the Russian defensive wall. This wall, covering hundreds of kilometers, has been considerably strengthened in recent months.
Russian wrath
Russia just claimed a military victory with the total capture of Bakhmut, after months of fighting and thousands of deaths. Ukraine says there are still pockets of resistance, but Putin needed a win: Bakhmut comes at just the right time.
By attacking Russian territory through rebels, Ukraine is mitigating the impact of the capture of Bakhmut. It forces Russia to deploy troops to protect the rear, when the clash could happen at the front.
Finally, it’s a rare circumstance in which Russian civilians are in turn subjected to the wrath of war, which Ukrainians have been experiencing unrelentingly for 15 months. The Kremlin’s revenge, as at every stage, is likely to be brutal. The escalation continues.
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